ABSTRACT Cloud computing provides service for resource-constrained customers to perform large-scale scientific computation. However, it also brings some new challenges, which have to be considered in designing outsourcing protocols. In recent years, a few outsourcing protocols have been proposed for different kinds of problems. Quadratic programming (QP) is a class of mathematical optimization problem, and solving a large-scale QP problem requires a large amount of computation. Thus, there is a great need for customer to outsource large-scale QP problem to cloud. In this paper, we design a secure, verifiable, and efficient outsourcing protocol for QP problem. For security consideration, we encrypt the matrices and vectors contained in the QP problem in an efficient way. After cloud computing, we decrypt the result to get the ultimate solution. To ensure correctness, we verify the result returned by the cloud through Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions that are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal solution. We also present complexity analysis and numerical simulations to illustrate the efficiency of our outsourcing protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is a type of promising computing paradigm that attracts increasing attentions [1] , [2] . There are a lot of advantages of cloud computing, such as accessing to on-demand resources, location independent and easy maintenance [3] - [5] .
Outsourcing computation is one important application of cloud computing [6] , [7] . One main advantage of outsourcing computation is that the customer can perform complex scientific computation with little overhead. Although outsourcing computation is advantageous, it also brings some new issues [8] - [11] .
Security is the first issue to be handled, according to the description of CSA Security Guidance [12] . Since both the outsourced tasks and the results to these tasks may contain sensitive information that the customer does not expect to be exposed to the cloud. To protect the input privacy, the customer has to encrypt the outsourced problem before sending it to cloud. Since the computation performed by the cloud is all in encryption domain, the result to the outsourced problem is also in encryption domain. The cloud can not judge the correct result to the original problem from the result to the encrypted one. The output privacy is also protected.
Verifiability is the second issue to be taken into consideration. The customer is compelled to verify whether the result returned is correct or not. Since the cloud may return a random result to save computing resources when the outsourced task is highly resource consumptive, especially [14] . Even though the cloud performs faithfully, some inevitable hardware and software bugs in cloud may also lead to a wrong result. So without the procedure of verification, the correctness of the result returned by the cloud can not be ensured. Lastly, efficiency is also an issue to be addressed. It requires that the overload of the customer should be substantially reduced when outsourcing is chosen. What's more, the amount of computation performed by the cloud is comparable to the overload of solving the original problem.
Considering the issues introduced above, it is necessary to design a protocol to make sure that the outsourcing computation is secure, verifiable, and efficient. In recent years, researchers have developed some practical protocols for different outsourcing computation tasks. Based on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [13] , an outsourcing protocol for solving large-scale linear equations is proposed in [14] . Some secure outsourcing protocols for matrix computation, such as matrix inversion [7] , matrix multiplication [15] and matrix determinant [16] are developed respectively. The outsourcing protocol for image reconstruction is introduced in [17] and the outsourcing protocol for linear programming is designed in [18] .
Mathematical optimization has found applications in various areas, such as computer science [19] , signal processing [20] , and economics [21] . It is defined as maximizing or minimizing an objective function by choosing input values from a feasible set. A special class of mathematical optimization is convex optimization where the objective function is convex, and the feasible region is a convex set [22] . Particularly, if the objective function is quadratic and the feasible region is constrained to a system of linear equalities and inequalities, it is called quadratic programming (QP). Quadratic programming has a variety of applications, e.g. support vector classification [23] , [24] , signal processing [25] , and image processing [26] , [27] . However, solving QP requires a lot of computing resources when its scale is large. Thus, it is attractive for the customer with low computing capability to outsource large-scale quadratic programming problem to the cloud. In this paper, we develop a secure, verifiable, and efficient protocol for outsourcing quadratic programming problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present some preliminaries. In section 3, we introduce the system model and our design goals. Then we provide the detailed techniques of our protocol in section 4. In section 5, we give the related analyses on our protocol. We introduce another outsourcing protocol for a special form of quadratic programming in section 6. The performance of the algorithm is evaluated in section 7. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in section 8.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. QUADRATIC PROGRAMMING
Quadratic programming is a special class of mathematical optimization, where the objective function is a quadratic function, and the constraints are a system of linear equalities and inequalities. In general, the quadratic programming problem can be expressed in the following form:
In particular, we assume that Q is an n×n positive definite matrix, A is an m×n full row rank matrix, B is a k×n full row rank matrix, both x and p are n×1 vectors, b is an m×1 vector, and c is a k×1 vector. Thus, the QP problem, denoted as , can be defined via a set of matrices and vectors
c).
In this paper, we further assume that the QP problem is feasible which means that there exists an x satisfying all the equalities and inequalities. Since Q is a positive definite matrix and the constraints are linear, the Slater's condition is satisfied according to the dual theory [22] . Then the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality. Before writing out the KKT conditions, we construct the Lagrange function for the QP problem:
where α 0 is an m×1 vector and β 0 is a k×1 vector. They are both Lagrange multipliers. The KKT conditions are described as follows: If x * is the optimal solution, then there exist α * and β * satisfying:
Particularly, α * and β * are the optimal solutions to the dual problem [22] .
B. KRONECKER DELTA FUNCTION AND KEY MATRIX
Kronecker delta function δ ij is widely used in engineering, which is defined as
Based on Kronecker delta function, we define the key matrix used later as
where ω 1 , . . . , ω n are randomly generated from the set . In this paper, we specify that the elements contained in are all positive. ψ is a bijection function, both its domain and range are the set S = {1, 2, . . . , n}. By this definition, the key matrix P is a permutation matrix. There are many features about the key matrix, such as square, invertible and sparse.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND DESIGN GOALS
In the system model of outsourcing computation, the customer is threatened by malicious behaviors of the cloud. As introduced in [30] , there are two cloud models in outsourcing computation: semi-honest model and malicious model. In semi-honest model, the cloud performs according to the protocol. But it intends to analyze the encrypted input and the output produced by itself. It makes effort on not only performing computation, but also learning sensitive information which should remain private. While the malicious cloud may deviate from the protocol and return a random answer hoping not to be detected by the customer in the meanwhile. In this model, the customer is compelled to verify the result for the purpose of resisting the cloud's cheating behavior. In this paper, we take the malicious cloud model into consideration.
As illustrated in Fig.1 , there are two parties involved in the system model of outsourcing QP problem. One party is the customer who has a large-scale QP problem to solve. But constrained by its limited computing resource, the customer intends to outsource the large-scale QP problem to the cloud. The other party is the cloud, who is equipped with powerful computing resources. The whole outsourcing process is illustrated as follows. First, to protect the input privacy, the customer encrypts the original QP problem into an encrypted one K with a secret Key K . Then K is delivered from the customer to the cloud. The cloud runs optimization algorithm to solve K when receiving the encrypted QP problem K . Next, the cloud provides both the solution and an appended proof to the customer. After getting the result, the customer verifies whether the solution returned is correct or not in encryption domain. If the result can not pass through verification, the customer claims the answer returned is wrong and requires the cloud to compute it again. Otherwise, the customer can get the ultimate optimal solution to the original QP problem by decrypting the correct result.
Our outsourcing protocol for QP problem is designed to achieve the following goals: 1) Security. Both the input privacy and the output privacy should be protected, which means any private information can not be exposed to the cloud. 2) Verifiability. The protocol should also ensure that if both the cloud and the customer behave accordingly, then the customer can judge the correctness of the result returned by the cloud and get the correct optimal solution to the original QP problem by decrypting the result. 3) Efficiency. First, the computation performed by the customer is substantially reduced, compared to solving the QP problem directly. Secondly, the computation overhead of the cloud is within the comparable burden on solving the original QP problem. This means the overhead introduced by our protocol should not be large. To achieve these goals, we design the following five subalgorithms, which correspond to the five rectangles in Fig. 1 , respectively: 1) Key generation algorithm (K ). The customer runs a randomized key generation algorithm to get the key which is used to encrypt the QP problem later. In this algorithm, the customer generates several key matrices and a random vector as our key.
The key K is generated by the KeyGen algorithm. The encryption algorithm takes K as input and encrypts the original QP problem into K using linear mapping. As we can see later, K is also a convex quadratic problem. 3) Algorithm to solve QP ( K ) → (y * , z * ). This algorithm performed by the cloud solves the problem K to produce both the output y * and a proof z * . The output y * can be decrypted by the customer using the secret key to get the optimal solution to , and the proof z * includes two Lagrange multipliers α * and β * which are used to test the correctness of y * . 4) Verification algorithm (y * , z * ) → ( ). The verification algorithm performed by the customer is to verify whether y * is the true solution to K . Since K is a convex quadratic problem, KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal solution y * . The customer verifies y * via KKT conditions and indicates the correctness in . 5) Decryption algorithm (K , y * ) → (x * ). If y * is correct, then the customer runs decryption algorithm to decrypt y * to get the optimal solution x * to original QP problem . Remark 1: In [28] and [29] , the authors considered outsourcing convex optimization with integrity assurance. Both the above papers and our paper use KKT conditions in verification, which is of no surprise, since KKT conditions are natural choice to verify the correctness of the result to a convex optimization problem when the problem satisfies the Slater's conditions. There are some significant differences between the above papers and ours, which can be clearly seen by comparing Fig.1 in this paper and [29, Fig. 1 ]. Firstly, our protocol is privacy-preserving and cheating resistant, while in the above papers, the authors concentrate on the security aspect of integrity assurance. In our paper, we assume that the cloud may not only return an incorrect answer but also be interested in learning sensitive information from the customer's input data. Thus, we use an encryption algorithm to prevent the original data from exposing to the malicious cloud. Then all the operations conducted by the cloud are in the encryption domain. While in the above papers, the authors focus on guaranteeing the result integrity of the outsourced computation. Though an encryption algorithm is used to prevent the third parties from getting the original data, the cloud can get it by running a decryption algorithm, and the cloud conducts the operations on the original data. So the sensitive information contained in the input data is exposed to the cloud. Secondly, in the above papers, the authors verify the result after decrypting, while we verify the result before decrypting. In other words, we use the KKT conditions also in the encryption domain. In this way, the customer can save some computing resources, since if the result returned is not correct, there is no need to decrypt it. The advantage of the scheme presented in [28] and [29] is that it is more general. It is suitable for general convex optimization problems, including quadratic programming.
IV. PROTOCOL DESIGN
In this section, we derive a secure, verifiable, and efficient outsourcing protocol for quadratic programming. Every part of the framework will be described individually.
A. KEY GENERATION ALGORITHM
In this algorithm, customer randomly generates three key matrices and a vector as below:
Here l i , m i , n i , r i are all randomly generated from the space which is defined in the Preliminaries, and ψ l , ψ m , n i are three different bijection functions. These three key matrices and one vector constitute the key which can be written as K (L, M , N , r).
The standard form of quadratic programming is shown in Eq. (1). We represent the QP problem using . Sending to the cloud directly, the customer will expose the matrices and vectors, which may contain sensitive information to the cloud. Therefore, the customer should encrypt the original QP problem into K using the secret K generated by itself.
1) Hiding equality constraints (A, b):
A randomly generated m×m key matrix M can be used for the purpose of hiding them. The customer can apply the matrix transformation to the equality constraints as follows,
where A = MA and b = Mb. As we know from Eq. (7), the matrix A is encrypted by exchanging its rows in a random order meanwhile every row is multiplied by a random positive scale m i . Since this transformation does not change the rank, A is also a full row rank matrix. The vector b is encrypted by rearranging its elements in a random order and multiplying a scale to each element meanwhile. As we can see, without knowing M , it is impossible for the cloud to determine the exact elements of A and b. The feasible region is not changed, since for an arbitrary vector x satisfying A x = b must satisfy Ax = b, and vice versa.
2) Hiding inequality constraints (B, c):
The customer can encrypt the inequality constraints in a similar way as hiding the equality constraints. It is obvious that the feasible regions defined by the following two groups of constraints are the same,
Here L is a random generated k × k key matrix whose every non-zero element is greater than zero. Thus, the matrix B and vector c are encrypted into B and c , where B = LB, c = Lc. Since L is a random key matrix, the matrix B and vector c are well masked. Thus, after hiding the equality and inequality constraints, the original QP problem is transformed into the following form:
3) Hiding objective function (Q, p): As we will see in the next subsection, the input privacy of Q and p can be protected in the output privacy preserving procedure.
2) PROTECTING OUTPUT PRIVACY
Though, through the above procedure, the input privacy is preserved, the output privacy is not achieved. In fact, although the customer can transform the constraints into a completely different form, the objective function and the feasible region defined by Eq. (10) are exactly the same as those of the original QP problem. Thus the solution to the encrypted QP is also the answer to the original one. This is not tolerated because the malicious cloud can leverage this information to get the knowledge of the original QP problem. Therefore, any secure QP protocol should not only be able to preserve input privacy but also be able to transform the feasible region to achieve output privacy.
In this paper, we transform the feasible region by an linear mapping on x. The approach of hiding output is illustrated below.
We adopt x = Ny + r as our linear transformation, where N is an n × n random key matrix, r is a random n × 1 vector and each element of r is generated from the space . We substitute x = Ny + r into Eq. (10), resulting in
Obviously, the last two terms of the above objective function are constants, so we can eliminate them and keep the solution unchanged at the same time. Then, we obtain:
Finally, the original QP problem is transformed into K which can be formulated as follows:
where
Thus, Q and p are encrypted into Q and p to achieve the input privacy. What's more, the matrix N T QN is a positive definite matrix as long as N is a key matrix. In other words, the objective function in Eq. (13) remains convex. We prove it as follows: for an arbitrary vector y = 0, we have Ny = 0 because N is an invertible matrix. Finally, since Q is a positive definite matrix, we have y T N T QNy = (Ny) T Q(Ny) > 0, which completes the proof. In summary, our encryption algorithm achieves the following three goals: Firstly, all the matrices and vectors contained in are masked to achieve input privacy. Secondly, the feasible region is transformed to achieve output privacy. Lastly, the encrypted problem defined as Eq. (13) is also a convex quadratic programming problem which ensures that we can verify the result returned by the cloud via KKT conditions.
After transforming into K , the customer sends K to the cloud. Then, the cloud runs the algorithm to solve the encrypted QP problem K . Finally the cloud provides the customer both the optimal solution y * to K and the proof z * which contains two Lagrange multipliers when it completes the computation.
C. VERIFICATION AND DECRYPTION ALGORITHM
In this subsection, we propose a method to verify the correctness of the solution y * returned by the cloud. In order to tell the optimal y * returned by the cloud without actually solving the QP problem K , the customer verifies whether y * and z * = {α * , β * } satisfy the KKT conditions:
If the KKT conditions are satisfied, then the customer decrypts y * to get the optimal solution x * to the original QP problem according to the formula of x * = Ny * + r. Otherwise, the customer records the unfaithful behavior of the cloud in and requires the cloud to compute K again.
V. PROTOCAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we show that our outsourcing protocol for QP problem is verifiable, efficient and secure.
A. VERIFICATION ANALYSIS
Our protocol ensures that the result returned by the cloud is verifiable for the fact that K is also a convex quadratic programming problem. The correctness of the result returned by the cloud can be verified via KKT conditions. Any correct result (y * , z * ) returned by the cloud can pass through the verification successfully, and any correct solution y * corresponds to the optimal solution x * to the original QP problem . This can be proved by the way of contradiction. Suppose y * is the correct solution to the K , but x * = Ny * +r is not the optimal solution to the original QP problem . Then, there exists an x such that f (x) < f (x * ), where Ax = b and Bx ≤ c. Becausê x = Nŷ + r, it is straightforward that f (ŷ) < f (y * ), where A ŷ = b and B ŷ ≤ c . In other words, there existsŷ which is a better solution than y * . It contradicts our assumption.
B. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
We analyze the efficiency of our protocol in this subsection. In our system model, there are four sub-algorithms performed by the customer, including key generation, encryption, verification and decryption algorithms. We analyze the complexity of these four algorithms individually.
First of all, we focus on the key generation algorithm which is introduced in section 4.1. The most time-consuming operation is to generate key matrices. Since L, M , N are all key matrices, it takes O(n) time to generate them.
Secondly, we analyze the complexity of the encryption algorithm which transforms the original QP problem into K . The whole task of this sub-algorithm is to encrypt into K via matrix transformation shown in Eq. (14) . The most time-consuming computation is to compute A = MAN , B = LBN , and Q = N T QN . Because of the good features of key matrix, we can compute these three matrices in an efficient way. We take computing A VOLUME 3, 2015 as example. To start with, we introduce a matrix Y = MA, thus A can be written as A = YN . The computing process is as follows: Firstly, we let
Since M (i, j) = m i δ ψ m (i), j and N (i, j) = n i δ ψ n (i), j , these lead to
Then, we have
Here ψ −1 n is the inverse function of ψ n , it is also a bijection function. Thus, it costs O(n 2 ) time to compute A . Both B and Q can be computed in the same way. Therefore, the overall time cost is O(n 2 ) for the customer to encrypt into K .
Thirdly, we perform the analysis on verification algorithm. The KKT conditions are listed as Eq. (3). The multiplication between matrix and vector, whose complexity is O(n 2 ), consumes the most running time.
Lastly, if the solution y * is correct, the customer then decrypts it to get the optimal solution x * by equation x * = Ny * + r. The most complex operation is multiplication between matrix and vector whose overhead is O(n 2 ).
All in all, the overall computation overhead to the customer is O(n 2 ). In contrast, it always costs more than O(n 3 ) [32] time to solve QP problem directly. There exists a great gap between O(n 2 ) and O(n 3 ) for a sufficiently large n.
Cloud side overhead is the time consuming on running the QPSolver algorithm. In this paper, the cloud returns the answer to K along with the Lagrange multipliers which are the solution to the dual problem of K . In other words, the cloud has to solve both the K and its dual problem. However, most common algorithms for QP problem like Interior Point method compute these two problems at the same time [33] . It implies that there is almost no additional computation tasks introduced by our protocol. This is what we expect because the cloud can save its computing resources at the most extent.
According to the analysis above, we conclude that the customer gains substantial computation savings, especially when the scale of QP problem is large. At the same time, our protocol makes the computing overhead in cloud as small as possible. Thus, from the perspective of efficiency, our protocol is feasible and practical. This conclusion will be further supported by our experiments.
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Input Privacy Guarantee: We start from the relationship between the original problem and the encrypted problem K as shown in Eq. (14) . The matrix A is encrypted by two steps. Firstly, the elements of A are randomly rearranged by two permutation functions ψ m and ψ n as Eq. (18) shows. ψ m is a permutation with m! kinds of possibilities and ψ n has n! kinds of possibilities. Thus, even if the cloud has the matrix R, where R(i, j) = A ψ m (i),ψ −1 n (j) , the expected time for the cloud to recover the original matrix A is (m!) × (n!). Secondly, every element of matrix A is masked by two random numbers m i and n ψ −1 n (j) . Here, these two random numbers are both generated from the space , so the cloud has to guess | | m+n times to get the exact random numbers, where | | is the size of the space . Overall, the expected time of brute-force guess
. If the cloud wants to get b from b , it has to know A and the random vector r. Thus, the expected time for the cloud to know b is (m!) × (n!) × | | m+2n . It is almost impossible for the cloud to recover the original matrix A and vector b, when the space is continuous. The other matrices and vectors in are encrypted in similar ways, so we eliminate the security analysis on these matrices and vectors.
We conclude that the input privacy is well protected by the encryption algorithm from the analysis aforementioned.
Output Privacy Guarantee: Since x * = Ny * + r, knowing the optimal solution y * , if the cloud wants to know the optimal solution x * to the original QP problem, it has to get the key matrix N and the random vector r. The cloud has to guess (n!) × | | n times to get M and | | n times to get r. Thus, it consumes the cloud almost (n!) × | | 2n time to recover x from y. Hence, the output privacy can also be achieved by selecting a large space .
To summarize, both the input privacy and output privacy are preserved by the encryption algorithm.
VI. A SPECIAL FORM OF QUADRATIC PROGRAMMING
In this section, we consider a special form of QP problem whose constraints are only equalities. Then, we introduce an outsourcing protocol for this kind of QP problem. To begin with, we represent the special form of QP as follows:
where Q is an n×n positive definite matrix, p is an n×1 vector, A is an m×n full row rank matrix, and b is an m×1 vector.
To solve this form of QP problem, we construct the Lagrange function as follows,
where ν is an m×1 Lagrange multiplier. Because of the convexity of the Lagrange function, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal solution x * can be expressed as:
where x * is the optimal solution, and ν * is the Lagrange multiplier. We write the two equations in the matrix form,
which leads to
To introduce our protocol further, we firstly prove that the matrix Q is invertible as long as Q is positive and A is full row rank. It can be proved by way of contradiction. Suppose Q is singular, then there must exist x and z which are not both zero, such that
This means
Multiplying Eq. (25) on the left by x T , we find that
It implies that x T Qx = 0, then x = 0 for Q is a positive definite matrix. Substituting x = 0 into Eq. (25), we have A T z = 0. Since A is full row rank, we have z = 0. Thus, both x and z are equal to zero, which contradicts our assumption. This completes the proof. Now that Q is nonsingular, the linear equations defined in Eq. (23) can be solved by
Thus, to compute optimal solution x, the main task is to compute the inverse matrix of Q. However, it costs O(n ρ ) (2.37 < ρ < 3) [34] time to compute inverse matrix. It is attractive for the customer to seek help from the cloud when the size of Q is large. Thus, it is necessary to design a secure, verifiable and efficient outsourcing protocol for matrix inversion. Fortunately, there exists such an outsourcing protocol which has been proposed in [7] . In order to make the paper self-contained, we describe the algorithm briefly below. 1) To protect the privacy of Q, the customer encrypt it by computing Y = P 1 QP 2 , where P 1 and P 2 are both key matrices which are defined in our preliminaries. Then, the customer sends Y to the cloud. After receiving Y , the cloud computes
1 and sends it back to the customer. We can see that both the input privacy and output privacy are protected.
2) To verify the result, the customer computesŶ = P 2 Y −1 P 1 , after receiving matrix Y −1 . If the cloud behaves according to the protocol and returns a correct answer, the matrixŶ equals to Q −1 . Thus, the customer checks if the vector Q(Ŷ r) − Ir is zero, where r is a randomly generated vector and I is an identity matrix. Note that, there exists some cases where the result returned by the cloud can pass through the verification even if the result is wrong, for example, when r equals to 0. Thus, it has to get rid of these cases by running the verification algorithm repeatedly which inevitably increases computation burden on the customer. Thus, it is a tradeoff between efficiency and cheating resistance.
3) The efficiency of this protocol can be analyzed as follows: Since P 1 and P 2 are key matrix, the overhead of the customer to compute Y andŶ is O(n 2 ). The time cost to compute Q(Ŷ r) − Ir for verification is also O(n 2 ). Therefore, The overall complexity is O(n 2 ) on the customer side. There is no additional computation introduced by this outsourcing protocol, because the only computation performed by the cloud is to compute matrix inversion. Note that, there is an additional matrix-vector multiplication computation in Eq. (28) . It can be computed in the process of verification if we let r = b in the last round of verification.
Remark 2: In fact, there are some other outsourcing protocols which can be utilized to solve the linear equations (23) , such as those in [14] and [16] . We choose outsourcing matrix inversion for the convergence and efficiency considerations. To ensure the convergence of the algorithm developed in [14] , the matrix Q should be strictly diagonally dominant or irreducibly diagonally dominant. But in some circumstances, Q may not satisfy this convergence condition. The solution of linear equations (23) can also be formulated as follows:
where Q i is the matrix formed by replacing the ith column of Q by the column vector b, det( Q i ) and det( Q) are determinants of matrix Q i and Q. The protocol for outsourcing matrix determinant computation has been developed in [16] , so we can use this protocol to compute (29) . However, in this protocol, the customer has to compute x i in (29) n times (i = 1, 2, . . . n) to get the complete optimal solution x, and the computation overhead in the customer side for computing x i is O(n 2 ), so the overall computation overhead to customer is O(n 3 ), which is greater than the overhead of outsourcing matrix inversion. These are the reasons why we choose the protocol for outsourcing matrix inversion to compute (23) .
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Based on the analyses of the protocol, we get the conclusion that the customer can save a lot of computing resources when choosing outsourcing. In this section, we design numerical experiments to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed protocol. In our experiments, both the client and the cloud server perform the computations on the identical computer with an Intel Core 4 Duo processor and 10GB RAM. We also assume that the communication between the customer and the cloud can be achieved with negligible time.
To measure the efficiency of our proposed protocol, we define some parameters as follows, t origin is the time the customer needed to compute the original QP by itself.
t customer is how long the customer spends on computing in the mechanism of outsourcing computation, including the time that the customer spends on encryption, verification and decryption.
t cloud is defined as the amount of time for the cloud to solve K . t origin t customer named as performance gain, represents the savings of the computing resources for the customer outsourcing QP problem. The performance gain is expected to be greater than 1, otherwise it is meaningless for the customer to outsource the QP problem.
We also define another metric named cloud efficiency gain calculated as
, measuring the overhead introduced to the cloud by the outsourcing protocol. This is why we implement our experiments in the same computer. Otherwise, if we implement it on two different computers with a customer and a real cloud server, then the time ratio can not tell anything meaningful. Since the computing time consumed depends not only on the amount of computation but also on the different computing power between two computers. It is expected that the ratio is close to 1, since the dimensions of all the vectors and matrices involving in K and are the same. In our experiments, we make m = k < n, and vary m from 64 to 4096, n from 128 to 8192. The performance of our protocol is shown as Table 1 .
It can be seen from Table 1 that the customer can achieve more than 57.18× savings, and with the increase of the size, the customer's performance gain is getting larger which supports our analysis in the above section. Besides, it is satisfactory that the cloud efficiency is close to 1, which means there is not substantial amount of overhead introduced to the cloud by our protocol. Thus, our outsourcing protocol is proved to be efficient by our numerical experiments.
The performance of the outsourcing protocol for the special case can be assessed by similar experiments. The experimental results are shown in Table 2 .
It can be seen from Table 2 that when the size of matrix is not large enough, the performance gain is less than 1. In this case, the time cost to compute inverse matrix is comparable to the time cost to compute multiplication between matrix and vector. The verification algorithm in outsourcing protocol computes this kind of multiplication many times to ensure the correctness of the result returned by the cloud. This is why the ratio is less than 1. However, when the size goes larger, the customer can get an ideal performance gain from the outsourcing protocol. This is because the time cost to compute large-scale matrix inversion is much greater than the time cost to compute multiplication between matrix and vector. For the cloud, the cloud efficiency is always close to but greater than 1, since there is an additional computation of multiplication between matrix and vector in the original QP problem compared to the outsourcing protocol. With the increase of the size, the ratio is in general getting closer to 1. Because the time cost in computing matrix inversion is so large that the time cost in the additional computation can be negligible.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have designed a protocol for outsourcing large-scale QP computations to a malicious cloud. We have shown that our mechanism fulfills the goals of security, cheating resilience and high efficiency. We have developed problem transformation techniques that enable customer to efficiently transform the original QP into some encrypted one to protect the sensitive input/output information. We verify the result by KKT conditions to ensure the correctness of result. Since quadratic programming is widely applied in scientific and engineering fields, the proposed protocol can not only be deployed individually, but also serve as a building block to some more sophisticated problems.
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